Dying To Win Robert Pape Pdf Printer

Topics Dying to Win, Great Speeches and Interviews, Scott Horton, Robert Pape, Destined for Destiny, Dana Milbank, Homo Politicus Scott Horton Interviews Robert Pape Robert A. Pape is an American political scientist known for his work on international security affairs, especially strategic air power and suicide terrorism.

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
AuthorRobert Pape
PublisherRandom House
2005
Pages352
ISBN1-4000-6317-5

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism is Robert Pape's analysis of suicide terrorism from a strategic, social, and psychological point of view. It is based on a database he has compiled at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. The book's conclusions are based on data from 315 suicide terrorism attacks around the world from 1980 through 2003. Of these, 301 were classified into 18 different campaigns by 11 different groups; the remaining 14 appear to have been isolated. Published in May 2005, Pape's volume has been widely noticed by the press, the public, and policymakers alike, and has earned praise from the likes of Peter Bergen, Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas),[1] and Michael Scheuer.[2]

Dying to Win The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism Robert A. Pape RANDOM HOUSE NEW YORK. Robert Pape Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Dying to win the strategic logic of terrorism pdf. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of.

Dying to Win is divided into three parts, analyzing the strategic, social, and psychological dimension of suicide terrorism.

  • 1Detailed synopsis
    • 1.1Introduction
    • 1.2Part I: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
    • 1.3Part II: The Social Logic of Suicide Terrorism
    • 1.4Part III: The Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism
    • 1.5Conclusion
    • 1.6Appendices

Detailed synopsis[edit]

Introduction[edit]

Ch. 1: The Growing Threat[edit]

Pape claims to have compiled the world's first 'database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003—315 attacks in all' (3). 'The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. .. Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland' (4). It is important that Americans understand this growing phenomenon (4–7).

Ch. 2: Explaining Suicide Terrorism[edit]

Caveat: the book's conclusions do not hold for terrorism in general (8–9). Pape distinguishes among demonstrative terrorism, which seeks publicity, destructive terrorism, which seeks to exert coercion through the threat of injury and death as well as to mobilize support, and suicide terrorism, which involves an attacker's actually killing himself or herself along with others, generally as part of a campaign (9–11). Three historical episodes are introduced for purposes of comparison: the ancient Jewish Zealots (11–12; see also 33–34), the 11th-12th-century IsmailiAssassins (12–13; see also 34–35), and the Japanese kamikazes (13; see also 35–37).

Pape had graduate students fluent in many languages scour the international press for incidents of suicide terrorism. There was no suicide terrorism from 1945 to 1980 (13–14). They found 315 incidents, beginning with the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing (14). They were able to classify all but 14 of the incidents into 18 different campaigns by 10 different organizations of predominantly Muslim, Hindu or Sikh religious persuasion. These included the Tamil Tigers (July 1990), the Israeli occupation of Palestine (1994), Persian Gulf (1995), Turkey (1996), Chechnya (2000), Kashmir (2000), and the U.S. (2001) (14–15). Five campaigns were still ongoing in early 2004, when Dying to Win was being written (15–16).

Traditional explanations for suicide terrorism focus on individual motives, but fail to explain the specificity of suicide terrorism (16–17). Economic explanation of this phenomenon yields 'poor' results (17–19). Explanation of suicide terrorism as a form of competition between radical groups is dubious (19–20).

Pape proposes an alternative explanation of the 'causal logic of suicide terrorism': at the strategic level, suicide terrorism exerts coercive power against democratic states to cease occupation of territory terrorists consider homeland, while at the social level it depends on mass support and at the individual level it is motivated by altruism (20–23). All 18 campaigns shared two elements: (1) a foreign occupation (2) by a democracy. Only one of the 10 groups shared a religion with the occupiers: the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey. 'The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation' (23).

Part I: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism[edit]

Ch. 3: A Strategy for Weak Actors[edit]

The willingness of an attacker to die has strategic value (27–29). As a weapon of weak groups incapable of 'denial' as a 'coercive strategy,' suicide terrorism relies on punishment and, especially, 'the expectation of future damage,' which provides coercive leverage (29–33).

Ch. 4: Targeting Democracies[edit]

Pape claims that his research reveals that the key to understanding the phenomenon of suicide attacks is not religion, but that they 'compel democracies to withdraw military forces from the terrorists' national homeland' (38). Patterns of timing (39–41), nationalist goals (42–44), and the targeting of democracies (44–45) reveal its logical, not irrational, nature. 'At bottom, suicide terrorism is a strategy for national liberation from foreign military occupation by a democratic state' (45). Foreign occupation is defined in terms of control of territory (not military occupation alone) (46). The targets selected by suicide terrorists suggests nationalist, not religious, aims (46–47). Hamas (47–51) and Al-Qaeda (51–58) are analyzed in some detail. In general, the harshness of occupation does not strongly correlate with suicide terrorism (58–60).

Ch. 5: Learning Terrorism Pays[edit]

Terrorists are predisposed to attribute success to their technique whenever plausible (62–64). Pape claims that 'recent suicide terrorist campaigns .. are associated with gains for the terrorists' political causes about half the time' (64–65). Hamas's success is difficult to evaluate, but Hamas spokespersons express belief in their own success (65–73). Terrorists learn from each other; the spread of the method is therefore neither irrational nor surprising (73–75). But suicide terrorism has failed 'to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security' (75–76).

Part II: The Social Logic of Suicide Terrorism[edit]

Ch. 6: Occupation and Religious Difference[edit]

'[T]he taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism' not religion (79). It is 'an extreme strategy for national liberation' (80). This explains how the local community can be persuaded to re-define acts of suicide and murder as acts of martyrdom on behalf of the community (81–83). Pape proposes a nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, seen from the point of view of terrorists. He analyzes the notions of occupation (83–84), homeland (84–85), identity (85–87), religious difference as a contributor to a sense of 'alien' occupation (87–88), foreign occupation reverses the relative importance of religion and language (88–92), and the widespread perception of the method as a 'last resort' (92–94). A statistical demonstration leads to the conclusion that a 'linear' rather than 'self-reinforcing spiral' explanation of suicide terrorism is best (94–100). However, different future developments of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism are very possible, and more study of the role of religion is needed (101).

Ch. 7: Demystifying al-Qaeda[edit]

With increasing knowledge of al-Qaeda, we see that 'the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-Qaeda suicide terrorists' (103). 'Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues .. than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat' (104). The nature of Salafism, a Sunni form of Islamic fundamentalism, is complex (105–07). Statistical analysis fails to corroborate Salafism-terrorism connection, but it does corroborate a connection to U.S. military policies in the Persian Gulf (107–17). Al-Qaeda propaganda emphasizes the 'Crusader' theme, which is inherently related to occupation (117–24). Pape concludes that 'the core features of al-Qaeda' are captured by his theory (125).

Ch. 8: Suicide Terrorist Organizations around the Globe[edit]

Robert Pape examines other campaigns to see if the 'dynamics that make religious difference important' are present in other terrorist campaigns, acknowledging the difficulty of the inquiry (126–29). He offers detailed analyses of Lebanon (129–39), Sri Lanka (139–54), the Sikhs in Punjab (154–62), and the Kurdish PKK in Turkey (162–66). His conclusion: 'Religion plays a role in suicide terrorism, but mainly in the context of national resistance' and not Islam per se but 'the dynamics of religious difference' are what matter (166–67).

Part III: The Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism[edit]

Ch. 9: Altruism and Terrorism[edit]

Pape presents a Durkheimian analysis of suicide (173–79). 'Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim calls altruistic suicide' (179). Analytical difficulties are acknowledged (180–81). Pape uses suicide rates in general as points of comparison (181–84). Team suicide, which is frequent in suicide terrorism, is an indicator of altruistic suicide, he argues (185–87). Altruistic suicide is a socially constructed phenomenon (187–88): e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon (188–91), Hamas (191–93), Tamil Tigers (193–95); al-Qaeda (195–96). The altruistic nature of suicide terrorism suggests the number of potential terrorists is large, that suicide terrorism is capable of growing in attractiveness and appeal, and that any attempt at profiling will miss a substantial number of potential suicide terrorists (197–98).

Ch. 10: The Demographic Profile of Suicide Terrorists[edit]

'In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future' (200). Pape discusses problems of of suicide terrorists available for analytical purposes (203). Hezbollah suicide bombers in the period 1982–1986 were 71% Communist/Socialist, 21% Islamist, 8% Christian (204–07). In general, suicide terrorists are in their early 20s (207–08). Females are fewer in Islamist groups: 'Islamist fundamentalism may actually reduce the number of suicide terrorists by discouraging certain categories of individuals' (208–09). Female suicide terrorists tend to be older than male (209–10). There is no documented mental illness in any case of suicide terrorism, though there are 16 cases of personal trauma (e.g., the loss of a loved one) (210–11). Arab suicide terrorists are in general better educated than average and are from the working or middle classes (211–16). '[T]hey resemble the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement more than they do wayward adolescents or religious fanatics' (216).

Ch. 11: Portraits of Three Suicide Terrorists[edit]

Earlier work has tended to emphasize suicide terrorists' irrationality, but this generalization fit 1980s data better than more recent data (217–20). Pape looks at three individual cases: Mohamed Atta (220–26); Dhanu, a young woman from Jaffna, 'the most famous Tamil Tiger suicide bomber' (226–30); and Saeed Hotari, of Hamas (231–34).

Conclusion[edit]

Ch. 12: A New Strategy for Victory[edit]

Though 'we' cannot leave the Middle East altogether, Pape asserts, a 'strategy for victory' is available (237–38). U.S. should define victory as the separate objectives of 'defeating the current pool of terrorists' and preventing a new generation from arising (238–39). He rejects Frum-Perle view that the root of the problem is in Islam (241–44). 'Rather, the taproot is American military policy' (244). The notion that Islamic fundamentalism is bent on world domination is 'pure fantasy' (244–45). An attempt by the West to force Muslim societies to transform 'is likely to dramatically increase the threat we face' (245). He calls for a policy of 'off-shore' balancing': establishing local alliances while maintaining the capacity for rapid deployment of military forces (247–50).

Appendices[edit]

Appendix I: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2003[edit]

Analysis of 18 campaigns.

Appendix II: Occupations by Democratic States, 1980–2003[edit]

Fifty-eight occupations by democratic states are listed (265–67).

Appendix III: Salafism in Major Sunni Muslim Majority Countries[edit]

Thirty-four countries with Sunni majority populations of 1 m or more and the importance of Salafism in these countries are the subjects of brief commentaries. Salafism is defined as 'the belief that society should be organized according to the Quran and Sunna only' (269). Sunni Countries with Salafi-Influenced Populations: Afghanistan (10 m Pashtuns); Algeria (19 m/31m Sunni Muslims); Bangladesh (14 m/114m); Egypt (23 m/62m); Indonesia (26 m/185m); Jordan (2 m/6m); Nigeria (37 m/68m); Oman (2 m/2m); Pakistan (43 m/149m); Saudi Arabia (18 m/18m); Somalia (5 m/10m); Sudan (21 m/21m); Tunisia (5 m/10m); Yemen (8 m/11m) (270–74). Non-Salafi Sunni Countries: Albania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (274–77).

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Critiques[edit]

In a criticism of Pape's link between occupation and suicide terrorism, an article titled 'Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' (published in The American Political Science Review), authors Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay from Princeton charge Pape with 'sampling on the dependent variable' by limiting research only to cases in which suicide terror was used:[3] Pape's analysis has no control group. Appendix II lists 58 occupations by democracies, only 9 of which generated suicide terrorism. An analysis explaining the difference between the 9 with suicide terrorism and the 49 without is lacking.

In response, Pape argues that his research design is sufficient because it collected the universe of known cases of suicide terrorism.[4] In a rejoinder, Ashworth et al. discuss how even large samples of the dependent variable cannot be used to explain variation in outcomes, why suicide terrorism in some places but not others, if the sample does not vary.[5]

In a debate hosted by the Washington Institute, Martin Kramer argued that Pape's thesis was less relevant to Al Qaeda than to Lebanon and Palestine and that there were only 12,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia in 2001 and they had not caused any deaths.[6] In response Pape argued that 'The U.S.-led war on terrorism is going badly because it is being waged on a faulty premise. That premise is that suicide terrorism is mainly a product of Islamic fundamentalism.'[7]

References[edit]

  1. ^Paul, Ron (2005-07-14) Suicide Terrorism, LewRockwell.com
  2. ^Scheuer, Michael (2005-06-10) Throwing America a Life Preserver, AntiWar.com
  3. ^American Political Science Review, Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 269-273.
  4. ^American Political Science Review, Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 275-277.
  5. ^Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/rejoinder3.pdf
  6. ^Kramer, Martin (November 8, 2005). 'Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response (Prepared Remarks)'. Washington Institute. Retrieved Jun 10, 2016.
  7. ^Pape, Robert (November 16, 2005). 'Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response'. Washington Institute. Retrieved Jun 10, 2016.

External links[edit]

  • Downloadable audio interview with Scott Horton
  • It's the Occupation Stupid by Robert A. Pape, Foreign Policy magazine, October 18, 2010

Robert Pape Murder

Retrieved from 'https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Dying_to_Win&oldid=884898873'

Robert Pape And Christian Smith

<p>Dying to Win:The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism Author: Robert A. Pape Publisher: Random House Date of Publication: May 2005 ISBN: 1400063175 No. of Pages: 352 Buy This Book [Summary published by CapitolReader.com on September 15, 2005] Click here for more political and current events books from Random House. About The Author: Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Robert A. Pape teaches international politics and serves as the Director of the Project on Suicide Terrorism. Pape contributes to The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, The Washington Post, as well as national television and radio programs. General Overview: The American public and Americas politicians seem convinced that the major problem between Arab countries and the United States are caused by the adherents to Islam and that religions belief in holy wars. Pape set out to determine whether this conclusion was correct. He collected extensive information on suicide bombings committed between 1980 and 2003 around the world. This data was entered into a database for analysis. What Pape discovered disproved the relationship between Islam, or religion in general, and the bombings. Pape found that 96 percent of suicides were part of larger coherent political or military campaigns whose specific goal was to compel modern democracies to withdraw their military forces from territories the suicide bombers regard as their homeland. Expurgating the who, what, why and how of suicide bombers as well as predicting their propensities in the future is the focus of Dying to Win.</p><p>* Please Note: This CapitolReader.com summary does not offer judgment or opinion on the books content. The ideas, viewpoints and arguments are presented just as the books author has intended.</p><p>- Page 1Published by CapitolReader.com. Copyright 2005, Capitol Reader and Shamrock New Media, Inc. No part of this summary may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior notice and consent from CapitolReader.com and Shamrock New Media, Inc. The respective copyrights of authors and publishers are acknowledged. The material provided is for general informational purposes only. Summarized by arrangement with The Random House Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.</p><p>The Growing Threat Suicide terrorism is rising around the world. Many attacks, or at least those most publicized, were conducted by Muslim terrorists with ostensibly religious motives. For this reason, the conclusion that eliminating Islamic theocracies and replacing them with democracies seemed a way to prevent future terrorist attacks. Professor Pape set out to determine if making democracies out of monarchies, theocracies or other Arab governance forms would stop terrorist attacks. Over 315 attacks from all over the world were carefully researched and put into a database. This is the first complete database of suicide bombings ever created. Data was compiled through interviews with the terrorist groups, news organizations in target countries and global news media. From the data, there does not appear to be an association between religion of any kind and suicide bombings. Three facts emerged from the research: 1. Most suicide bombings are connected to larger, well-organized political or military strategies to evict democratic invaders from the bombers homeland. 2. Democracies are the target of these attacks. 3. Suicide bombers overwhelming desire is for personal or national selfdetermination. Suicide bombing attacks have become a mainstay for terrorist groups to achieve their strategic goals. The primary goal of the suicide bombings repeatedly staged against the United States, France, India, Israel, Russia, Sri Lanka and Turkey has been to liberate the bombers from occupation by the countries they are attacking. What is frightening is that the number of these types of attacks is increasing. In 2002 and 2003, Al Qaeda staged more attacks than in all the years prior to 2001. Since there is a clear and definitive association between occupation and suicide bombings, the war in Iraq is exactly the wrong strategy for stopping terrorist attacks. It is likely to increase the number and severity of such attacks. Explaining Suicide Terrorism The goal in assembling such a complete record of suicide terrorist acts was to explain the causes of and the reasons for the increases in suicide terrorism. But the goal was also intended to make clear where and how this practice has proliferated and, most importantly, what can prevent it. Studying this phenomenon will hopefully produce recommendations for policies that would be more successful than those based on assumptions. Suicide terrorist groups share several characteristics. They have fewer assets, weapons and members than their opposition. Usually, suicide terrorists have support for their political goals among members of a distinct national community. Suicide terror groups are typically devoted to their leaders and each other. Group initiates must pass through a system of rituals designed to test and strengthen member commitment to the group and its goals. Suicide groups also frequently receive financial assistance from countries that share their political goals. Regardless of aid given, suicide groups remain self-directed.- Page 2Published by CapitolReader.com. Copyright 2005, Capitol Reader and Shamrock New Media, Inc. No part of this summary may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior notice and consent from CapitolReader.com and Shamrock New Media, Inc. The respective copyrights of authors and publishers are acknowledged. The material provided is for general informational purposes only. Summarized by arrangement with The Random House Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.</p><p>Terrorism, both suicidal and non-suicidal, was created to intimidate a target audience and coerce them into changing their policies, strategies or implementations of both. Terrorists of both types use their tactics to gain and mobilize community and/or international support. Attacks can also be used to remove rival terror groups from the political landscape. Groups that practice suicide terrorism want to coerce both their opposition and their peers into embracing their politics. Tactics employed by suicide terrorists usually kill the terrorist as well as large numbers of other people. Because protecting the terrorist from harm is not a consideration, these groups use things like car bombs, planes flown into buildings or crowds and suicide vests. The advantage to the suicide approach is that the terrorist is able to ensure that the killing device reaches its target precisely. Similar tactics such as taking a gun to a public locations and shooting bystanders until killed or captured are not included in the suicide terrorist classification. True suicide attacks ensure the death of the terrorist as well as the death of many others. Given the scale of the September 11th suicide attacks, unraveling the mystery of the motivation of suicide terrorists becomes a very important part of understanding how to prevent such attacks. Orthodox terrorist theory has not addressed suicides specifically and studies that speculate that suicide terrorists have been suicidal or predisposed by religious training to killing themselves have not been effective in explaining why such attacks are increasing. For the theory of religious indoctrination or depression to be true, rates of either the associated religion or severe depression would have to have increased along with the increase in suicide terrorism. The largest cohort of suicide terrorists is the Tamil Tigers, who are not only not religious, but against religions. One-third of the suicide bombings committed in Muslim countries were executed by secular, non-Islamic-affiliated terrorist organizations. Islamic fundamentalists executed only half of the suicide attacks that occurred worldwide from 1980 to 2003. Viewed in this context, religious indoctrination cannot be said to be a complete explanation for suicide terrorism. Explaining suicide terrorism as an affect of an underlying depressive state is also an insufficient explanation when viewed in context. For suicide attacks to be a result of an underlying depressive disorder, the distribution of such attacks would be random, global and across all socio-economic groups just as depression is. The fact is that the overwhelming majority of societies dont experience suicide terrorist attacks. When countries experiencing political turmoil are cross-referenced to suicide terrorist attacks, there is no randomization. Dozens of these attacks have occurred in a handful of countries and bypassed the majority of the globe. Clearly, there has to be a sociological/economic/political explanation for why suicide bombers attack over and over in the same countries.</p><p>- Page 3Published by CapitolReader.com. Copyright 2005, Capitol Reader and Shamrock New Media, Inc. No part of this summary may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior notice and consent from CapitolReader.com and Shamrock New Media, Inc. The respective copyrights of authors and publishers are acknowledged. The material provided is for general informational purposes only. Summarized by arrangement with The Random House Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.</p><p>Suicide Terrorism Causes Before this study, suicide terrorism experts held that the individuals who perform such acts were: uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, male, single, in their late teens and early 20s. The reality is that suicide terrorists come from a wide variety of backgrounds: college educated, non-educated, men, women, married, single, isolated, socially integrated and ranging in age from 15 to 52. Most did not exhibit suicidal tendencies; those who did manifest such symptoms were in the minority. Recently, some terrorism experts have suggested that suicide terrorism is a product of poverty or competition among nonstate groups. Poverty is an appealing explanation, but it is wrong. If poverty were the reason for suicide bombings, then the poorest countries should have bumper crops of people willing to strap on high explosives and hurl themselves at the problem. Among the poorest countries in the world, with average per capita incomes of three digits maximum, there have been no suicide bombings. Nor have their impoverished citizens volunteered to be bombers elsewhere. Similarly, the competition between similar groups theory doesnt appear to be adequate either. First, there are a number of countries with violent terrorist groups. Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Nigeria and Somalia all have several terrorist groups, but not one of these countries has experienced suicide bombings. Secondly, there are several Palestinian terrorist organizations and without exception, they use suicide bombings as a tactic. The presence of competitive groups doesnt appear to have increased the pace of these bombings as one would expect if only competition were the motivation. Lastly, the Tamil Tigers and Al Qaeda had no competition in their respective countries, yet initiated and continue to conduct suicide bombings. If poverty, psychological state and inter-group rivalry do not cause suicide terrorism, what are its causes? Intrinsic to the understanding of the phenomenon is the fact that terrorist suicide bombings are not driven by individual motivations, but by group motivations. While there may be a number of individual attacks, they are always driven by the strategic needs of a group. These attacks, generally occurring in clusters, are part of an organized plan to attain a specific goal. Contrary to popular belief, the motivations behind suicide bombings are not religious or specifically Islamic, but nationalistic. Regardless of their location, be it Indonesia or the West Bank or the United States, every group engaging in suicide terror tactics has had ridding their country of a foreign state with military forces in the terrorists perceived homeland. Without exception, the target countries have been democracies. Terrorists view democracies as more susceptible to coercion than other forms of government. This pattern fits all suicide terrorist groups including Al Qaeda where Osama bin Ladens priority is to coerce the U.S. to leave Saudi Arabia. Rates for suicide terrorism have been rising very rapidly for 20 years. Terrorists are embracing this tactic because it works. Groups employing this tactic have had victories they succeeded in getting the French out of Lebanon and the Sri Lankan government to- Page 4Published by CapitolReader.com. Copyright 2005, Capitol Reader and Shamrock New Media, Inc. No part of this summary may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior notice and consent from CapitolReader.com and Shamrock New Media, Inc. The respective copyrights of authors and publishers are acknowledged. The material provided is for general informational purposes only. Summarized by arrangement with The Random House Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc.</p><p>create a separate state for the Tigers - and because their fellow countrymen perceive suicide terrorists as patriots, they generally find support in their homeland. While suicide terrorism is always in response to an occupying force, not all occupations result in suicide terrorism. Terrorist groups are most likely to engage in suicide attacks when the religion of the occupier is different than that of the populace of the occupied country. In this situation, the terrorists are reacting to a fear that the occupier will change the occupied society. This fear of change - being forced to adopt a new religion or be prohibited from practicing ones traditional religion - makes it easy to demonize the enemy. Killing the enemy thus becomes not murder, but a battle against the forces of evil. The religious element also permits suicide to be transformed into martyrdom. Because, contrary to conventional thinking on who becomes a suicide bomber, those who volunteer for suicide missions kill themselves not out of a sense of hopelessness or despair, they kill themselves (and their victims) to save their homeland and the community that they are very integrated into and which has given them a comfortable existence. Therefore, Americas current policies for fighting terrorism are wrong-headed from theory to implementation. Offensive military force, particularly when used to occupy an Arab country, is likely to accelerate suicide terrorism. Concessions to keep the peace will also not be effective over the long-term because they arent addressing the core issue. Being successful in fighting terrorism requires deterring attacks while altering the conditions that produced the terrorism to begin with. Using military offensive force will create more, not fewer suicide terrorists. The Strategy Behind..</p>